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NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina's interest in the subject matter of litigation is greater
than that of Pennsylvania.
Many authorities consider the loss of the advantages inherent in
lex loci delicti a small price to pay for a conflict of laws rule which
would permit greater recognition of governmental interests. It is
hoped that if, and when, the North Carolina Supreme Court accedes
to this position, the reason for abandonment of the traditional rule
will not be ignored in application of the new.
WILLIAM E. SHINN, JR.
Consent Judgment-Reservation of Rights Against
Third Party-Release
In a recent North Carolina case,' plaintiff passenger brought an
action against two defendants as joint tortfeasors for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile collision. While the action was pending the
plaintiff entered into a covenant not to sue, -consent judgment and
satisfaction of that judgment with A. Both the covenant not to sue and'
the consent judgment reserved the rights of the plaintiff against the
other defendant, B, a corporation. In the pending action B- pleaded
that the transactions constituted, a release of one of the two joint
tortfeasors and therefore barred further recovery against the de-
fendant corporation. The jury found that the transactions consti-
tuted a covenant not to sue and awarded damages. The trial judge
set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a new trial at which the
transactions were concluded to be a release. The court affirmed this
decision stating that the agreement, consent judgment -and satis-
faction extinguished the cause of action notwithstanding the inten-
tion of the parties; therefore; the plaintiff was barred from further
recovery. This raises the question, of whether a consent judgment
should be given the same effect as a judgment after trial or whether
a consent judgment should be viewed merely as a contract approved
by the court, thereby allowing the court to look behind the agree-
ment and determine whether the intention of the parties has been
carried out.
When a person is injured by the negligence of joint tortfeasors,
he may elect to sue them either jointly or individually.' There has
'Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843.(1963).
2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 882 (1939).
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been some confusion concerning the effect which a judgment against
one joint tortfeasor will have on the rights of the other tortfeasors.
The early English rule, until changed by statute in 1935,1 provided
that there was only one cause of action in joint torts4 and that a
judgment against one, even though unsatisfied, merged with the
single cause of action and was a bar to further action.' If the de-
fendants were concurrent tortfeasors,0 there were multiple causes
of action and an unsatisfied judgment against one did not bar re-
covery against the others.7 The American courts, due to the code
method of pleading,' no longer distinguish between joint and con-
current tortfeasors but permit joinder of parties in situations where
the independent negligence of both defendants produces a single in-
jury9 or where defendants were under a common duty." In the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary11 the rule in this country rejects
'Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26
Geo. 5, c. 30.
" The common law rules as to joinder were restricted to those who acted
in concert of action. Where there was concert of action, joinder was per-
mitted but not compulsory, and the defendants could be sued severally for
the entire damages. Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5a, 77 Eng. Rep.
1150 (1613); Smithson v. Garth, 3 Lev. 324, 83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1691).
See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
Brinsmead v. Harrison, [1872] L.R.7C.P. 547 (joint detinue); Brown
v. Wooten, Cro. Jac. 73, 79 Eng. Rep. 62 (1600) (joint trover); King v.
Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, 153 Eng. Rep. 245 (1838) (joint trespass). See 13
HALSDU RY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Estoppel § 471 (2d ed. 1934). See generally
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 241.
8 If the defendants joined separately and independently to cause a single
injury, the early English courts would not permit the plaintiff to bring a
joint action against both. Sadler v. Great W. Ry., [1896] A.C. 450. See
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 236.
"Morris v. Robinson, 3 B. & C. 196, 107 Eng. Rep. 706 (1824).
8 "[I]n this country..., where the wrongful acts of two or more per-
sons, though independent, were concurrent and resulted in a single injury
to the plaintiff, such persons are considered joint tort-feasors for the purpose
of suit." CLARX, CODE PLEADING § 60, at 383-84 (2nd ed. 1947).
' Way v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & No. R.R., 239 Iowa 244, 29 N.W.2d 867
(1947); Meyer v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E.2d 173
(1952).
10 Schaffer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 101 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1939); Doeg v.
Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 Pac. 707 (1899); Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va.
639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897).
" R. I. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 10-6-6 (1956) was construed in Hacket v.
Hyson, 72 R.I. 132, 48 A.2d 353 (1946) to reverse the common law notion
in America that satisfaction of judgment effected a discharge of all tort-
feasors and held that satisfaction is merely applied in reduction of any judg-
ments against the others. Contra, McTigue v. Levy, 260 App. Div. 928, 2
N.Y.S.2d 114 (1940) construing N.Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 112-a; Sarine v.
American Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 258 App. Div. 653, 17 N.Y.S.2d 754
(1940) construing N.Y. CREDITOR & DEBTOR LAW § 232.
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the idea that a mere rendition of a judgment against one tortfeasor
releases the others and holds that nothing short of satisfaction of
the judgment will bar the plaintiff from proceeding further."2 The
plaintiff may recover separate judgments against all the joint tort-
feasors, and until he accepts satisfaction the cause of action is not
extinguished. If the plaintiff gets only one judgment and accepts
satisfaction of that judgment, his cause of action is extinguished
and he cannot bring any further action against the other defendants.
The theory behind the American rule stems from the common law
notion that a person is entitled to but one compensation."3 Since
the plaintiff's cause of action against the joint tortfeasors is single
and indivisible, the reducing of his claim to judgment merges the
cause of action in the judgment and the satisfaction of that judg-
ment is a satisfaction and settlement of the whole cause of action.14
Merely a partial satisfaction of the judgment does not extinguish the
cause of action but does credit the amount paid to that clue from the
remaining tortfeasors.' 5 Moreover, once satisfaction of judgment
has been tendered, the court rendering the judgment cannot reserve
the rights of the plaintiff against the other torffeasors."6 Since the
plaintiff has an indivisible cause of action and can receive but one
satisfaction for that cause, he has no right to split that single cause
or apportion it. The court could not grant the plaintiff this right by
its judgment; therefore, that portion of the judgment which reserves
the plaintiff's rights would be inoperative as beyond the power of
the court to render. 7 This implies that once the plaintiff accepts full
satisfaction of a judgment from one defendant, it constitutes a re-
lease of the other defendant by operation of law notwithstanding
" Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1 (1865). RESTATEmENT, TORTS
§ 886 (1939). See Annot., 166 A.L.R. 1099 (1947), supplementing, Annots.,
27 A.L.R. 805 (1923) and 65 A.L.R. 1087 (1930).
18 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 241-42.
14 City of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 171 Okla. 565, 43 P.2d
434 (1935); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 Pac. 641(1928).
"
8Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 17 (1865) ; 2 BLACK, JUDG-
mENTS § 782, at 1182 (2d ed. 1902).
18 Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 120 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1941); City
of Weturnka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 171 Okla. 565, 43 P.2d 434
(1935); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 Pac. 641(1928).
"'City of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 171 Okla. at 566, 43
P.2d at 436; Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. at 28, 267 Pac. at
644.
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the intentions of the parties in bringing the suit or the court in ren-
dering its judgment. While no authority can be found in North
Carolina in which a judgment reserved the rights of the plaintiff
to proceed further, North Carolina has followed the same line of
reasoning as the majority in holding that satisfaction of a judgment
extinguishes the indivisible cause of action,"' thereby indicating that
the operation takes place by way of law rather than by construction.
A judgment by consent has been defined as an agreement or con-
tract of the parties, acknowledged in court and ordered to be re-
corded, with the sanction of the court.19 It is usually agreed to have
dual aspects-that of an agreement between the parties and that of
an entry of judgment by the court. Because of the contractual aspect
of the consent judgment, it is always relevant in determining the
effect of the judgment, to ascertain the intent of the parties." How-
ever where there has been an agreement, consent judgment and
satisfaction, the majority of cases do not distinguish between a judg-
ment by consent and a judgment after trial and issue. In this situa-
tion the courts have rejected the contractual aspect, and hold that
the satisfaction of the consent judgment extinguishes the cause of
action by operation of law irrespective of the intention of the par-
ties."' When applied to the joint tortfeasor situation this rule merely
applies the basic law concerning satisfaction of judgment and dis-
18 Bell v. Hankins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642 (1958); Burns v.
Womble, 131 N.C. 173, 42 S.E. 573 (1902).19Keach v. Keach, 217 Ky. 723, 290 S.W. 708 (1927); McArthur v.
Thompson, 140 Neb. 408, 299 N.W. 519 (1941); McRary v. McRary, 228
N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948); Union Bank v. Commissioners of Oxford,
119 N.C. 214, 25 S.E. 966 (1890); Blair v. Dickinson, 136 W. Va. 611, 68
S.E.2d 16 (1951).
" "The extent to which a judgment or decree entered by consent is con-
clusive in a subsequent action should be governed by the intention of the
parties as expressed in the agreement which is the basis of the judgment and
gathered from all the circumstances, rather than by a mechanical application
of the general rules governing the scope of estoppel by judgment." Annot.,
2 A.L.R.2d 514, 520 (1948).
2 Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 120 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Jen-
kins v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 F. Supp. 820 (S.D. Cal. 1937); Battle v.
Morris, 265 Ala. 581, 93 So.2d 428 (1957); Vattani v. Damiano, 9 N.J.
Misc. 290, 153 Atl. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Sykes v. Wright, 201 Okla. 346,
205 P.2d 1156 (1949); City of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 171
Okla. 565, 43 P.2d 434 (1935); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla.
25, 267 Pac. 641 (1928); Blake v. Kansas City So. Ry., 38 Tex. Civ.
App. 337, 85 S.W. 430 (Civ. App. 1905). Contra, Colby v. Walker, 86
N.H. 568, 171 At. 774 (1934). See generally Annot., 135 A.L.R. 1498
(1941).
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cards any notion of construction. This treatment by the courts has
been described as a condition which society places on the parties as
a price for the granting of judgment.22 The effect of not exacting
this price would be to give some credence to the contractual nature
of a consent judgment and ultimately to the intention of the parties.2"
The court by imposing a rule of construction, would apply the same
criteria it uses in construing releases and covenants not to sue.24
If it could be seen from looking at the instrument as a whole that
the plaintiff intended to receive full satisfaction from one defendant
or to abandon his cause of action against that defendant, then the
consent judgment should operate as a release, and plaintiff would be
barred from further recovery. 5 If the construction showed that
neither full satisfaction nor an abandonment were intended, then it
should have the effect of a covenant not to sue.2 6 By treating a
consent judgment in this fashion, the court would be substituting
a rule of construction for a rule of law.
North Carolina has recognized both the contractual and judg-
ment aspects of the consent judgment. Many North Carolina cases
hold that a consent judgment is res judicata between the parties in
the same manner as a judgment after trial and issueY.2  There is also
2 James, Conment Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
173, 176 (1959).13 Colby v. Walker, 86 N.H. 568, 171 Ati. 774 (1934). See Sykes v.
Wright, 201 Okla. 346, 349, 205 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
2 See 22 MINN. L. Rsv. 692 (1938) ; 30 N.C.L. REv. 75 (1951).
2 E.g. Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.C.
1953); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Burgess, 223 N.C. 97, 25 S.E.2d
390 (1943) ; Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N.C. 127, 141 S.E. 489 (1928) ; Sircey
v. Hans Rees' Sons, 155 N.C. 296, 71 S.E. 310 (1911); Howard v. J. H.
Harris Plumbing. Co., 154 N.C. 224, 70 S.E. 285 (1911) ; Burns v. Womble,
131 N.C. 173, 42 S.E. 573 (1902) ; Brown v. Town of Louisburg, 126 N.C.
701, 36 S.E. 166 (1900).
26 In North Carolina, a covenant not to sue does not release the other
tortfeasors from the cause of action, however compensation from the cove-
nantee is set off against any defendant who wishes to litigate rather than
settle. Butler v. Norfolk So. Ry., 140 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1956); Ram-
sey v. Camp, 254 N.C. 443, 119 S.E.2d 209 (1961) ; Holland v. Southern Pub.
Util. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180 S.E. 592 (1935); Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N.C.
346, 95 S.E. 557 (1918); Winston v. Dalby, 64 N.C. 299 (1870).
"' See Stone v. Carolina Coach Co., 238 N.C. 662, 78 S.E.2d 605 (1953);
Herring v. Queen City Coach Co., 234 N.C. 51, 65 S.E.2d 505 (1951);
Boucher v. Union Trust Co., 211 N.C. 377, 190 S.E. 226 (1937); Tilley v.
Lindsey, 203 N.C. 410, 166 S.E. 168 (1932); Lalonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C.
771, 164 S.E. 359 (1932); Morris v. Patterson, 180 N.C. 484, 105 S.E. 25
(1920) ; Simmons v. McCullin, 163 N.C. 409, 79 S.E. 625 (1913) ; Donnelly
v. Wilcox, 113 N.C. 408, 18 S.E. -339 (1893). The language in the North
Carolina cases is to the effect that a consent judgment is as binding on the
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authority to the effect that a consent judgment is a decree of the
parties, not of the court; that it should be construed as any other con-
tract and that the judgment should be given effect in light of that
construction."' By its decision in Simpson v. Plyler29 North Caro-
lina has discarded those cases calling for construction of the consent
judgment and has joined the majority in decreeing that satisfac-
tion of the consent judgment extinguishes the cause of action by
operation of law.
The question arises whether consent judgments should be given
an effect beyond what the parties intended-should such a condition
be imposed by society on the parties as a price for granting a judg-
ment ?3o It is the opinion of the writer that the contractual nature
of the consent judgment offers reasons for not doing so.
Since the doctrine of merger applies only when the judgment
has been fully satisfied,"' the question of satisfaction is highly im-
portant in raising the bar.3 2 In a judgment by trial and issue, the
parties as a judgment after trial, and cannot be changed without consent of
the parties or set aside except for fraud or mutual mistake.28 Cason v. Shute, 211 N.C. 195, 189 S.E. 494 (1937); Southern Eng'r
Co. v. Boyd, 191 N.C. 143, 131 S.E. 305 (1926); Southern Distrib. Co. v.
Carraway, 189 N.C. 420, 127 S.E. 427 (1925); Walker v. Walker, 185 N.C.
380, 117 S.E. 167 (1923); Holloway v. City of Durham, 176 N.C. 550, 97
S.E. 486 (1918); Idding v. Hiatt, 51 N.C. 402 (1859).28258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963).
30 See James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 173 (1959), for the argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
should not apply to consent judgments.
" "[W]hen the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury
done him, from whatever source it may come, he is so far affected in equity
and good conscience, that the law will not permit him to recover again for
the same damages. But it is not easy to see how he is so affected, until he
has received full satisfaction, or that which the law must consider as such."
Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 17 (1865).
*" "'[W]here the bar accrues in favor of some of the wrongdoers by rea-
son of what has been received from or done in respect to one or more others,
that the bar arises, not from any particular form that the proceeding assumes,
but from the fact that the injured party has actually received satisfaction,
or what in law is deemed the equivalent. Therefore, if he accepts the satis-
faction voluntarily made by one, that is a bar to all. And so a release of one
releases all, although the release expressly stipulates that the other de-
fendants shall not be released. And this rule is held to apply, even though
the one released was not in fact liable. It does not lie in the mouth of such
plaintiff to say that he had no cause of action against one who paid him for
his injuries, for the law presumes that the one who paid committed the
trespass and occasioned the whole injury'. . . . It is immaterial whether
the satisfaction is obtained by judgment and final process in execution of it
or by amicable adjustment without any litigation of the claim for damages.
The essential thing is satisfaction." Sircey v. Hans Rees' Sons, 155 N.C.
296, 300-01, 71 S.E. 310, 312 (1911).
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damages of the plaintiff have been determined and set by the court
serving in its judicial office so that it can readily be seen whether
full or partial satisfaction has been received. In a consent judgment,
however, the amount of satisfaction has been settled by the parties
in their agreement and entered into the record by the court acting
in its ministerial office. 33 Since the court has neither set nor deter-
mined the plaintiff's damages, it can not be seen from the payment
of the judgment alone whether there has been full or partial satis-
faction. Instead of flatly inferring full satisfaction, the better alter-
native to the court would be to construe the intent of the parties
in the light of the circumstances to see whether full satisfaction was
intended.
The argument for the finality of judgments 84 rests on the logic
that if the consent judgment in the first suit is held to be binding
in the second, it will diminish litigation by eliminating trials in both
cases. However, if the first suit was not intended to be binding in
the second, an ignorant party would be highly susceptible to entrap-
ment. On the other hand, a party having knowledge of the binding
effect would be less willing to compromise, resulting in more con-
tested trials in the first suit. Thus the binding effect of a consent
judgment would present a detriment to desirable compromise and
would increase trials by contest.
The argument against double satisfaction85 is feeble ground for
the courts to tread in binding the plaintiff to a consent judgment
in which full compensation was not in fact paid, since in such a
situation the plaintiff might be inadequately compensated. By con-
struing the consent judgment as a contract, the court could determine
whether full satisfaction was or was not intended-thus better pro-
tecting the plaintiff against inadequate compensation as well as
the defendant against double vexation.
J. AD. WALSH
"The process in North Carolina is even less of a judicial determination
because N.C. GENT. STAT. § 1-209(b) (1953), provides for the entry of con-
sent judgments by the clerk of the Superior Court.
" See James, supra note 30, at 184-85.
as Id. at 185.
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